

## Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 USNATO 2854

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: DATA ISSUES: UK STATEMENT AND PAPER RE SPC MANDATE  
TO WG

REF: STATE 118334

SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS A SHORT UK STATEMENT RE SPC  
MANDATE ON DATA ISSUES TO WG, BASED ON UK REMARKS AT MAY 21  
SPC MEETING, AND A LONGER UK PAPER ORIGINALLY INTENDED FOR SUBMISSION  
IN WG, BUT CIRCULATED IN SPC TO FACILITATE SPC DECISION ON  
MANDATE TO WG. IT SEEMS CLEAR FROM UK STATEMENT THAT UK  
HAS NOW MOVED AWAY FROM ITS WILLINGNESS AT MAY 15 SPC MEETING  
TO EXCLUDE TANK DATA FROM THE MANDATE TO WG WHICH IS PRESENTLY  
UNDER CONSIDERATION. ACTION REQUESTED: ANY FURTHER COMMENT  
WASHINGTON MAY WISH TO MAKE, IN LIGHT OF UK STATEMENT AND  
PAPER, IN TIME FOR SPC MEETING TUESDAY, MAY 27. END SUMMARY.

1. BEGIN TEXT OF UK STATEMENT:

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MBFR: USE OF DATA: POSSIBLE MANDATE TO MBFR WORKING GROUP

WHILE WE WOULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE REVISED  
MANDATE TO THE WORKING GROUP MOOTED IN THE SENIOR POLITICAL

COMMITTEE ON 15 MAY, THE UK STILL BELIEVES THAT THERE IS A STRONG CASE FOR ALLOWING THE WORKING GROUP STUDY TO COVER A WIDER FIELD. IF THE WARSAW PACT DO, AS THEY HAVE INDICATED, ENGAGE US IN A DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS AND DATA IN THE ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS NOW BEGINNING IN VIENNA WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE AD HOC GROUP WILL HAVE TO SEEK GUIDANCE FROM THE SPC, PERHAPS IN THE QUITE NEAR FUTURE, ON HOW TO RESPOND TO EASTERN CHALLENGES AIMED AT ANY OR ALL OF THE ESTIMATES WHICH THE WEST HAS SO FAR TABLED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND IN PARTICULAR OUR ESTIMATES

OF WARSAW PACT STRENGTHS. THE SPC WILL BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO ANSWER THESE REQUESTS IF THE WORKING GROUP HAS ADVISED BEFOREHAND ON THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION.

OUR REASONING MAY BE RESUMED AS FOLLOWS. DURING THE PREVIOUS ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS THE WARSAW PACT HINTED, IN BILATERAL MEETINGS, THAT THEY MIGHT REVERT TO THE "ANOMALIES" IN THE PRESENT DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES. WE THINK THEIR AIM IN THIS WILL BE TO BRING IN QUESTION THE SIZE OF THE MANPOWER DISPARITIES INDICATED BY ALLIED DATA ESTIMATES TABLED SO FAR. OUR ESTIMATE OF THE SIZE OF WARSAW PACT FIRCES IS A KEY ELEMENT IN DEMONSTRATING THESE DISPARITIES, SHICH FORM THE BASIS FOR THE WHOLE WESTERN CASE FOR ANYMMETRICAL SRDUCTIONS BY THE WARSAW PACT LEADING TO A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

SINCE WE HAVE ALREADY TABLED MANPOWER ESTIMATES BOTH FOR OUR OWN FORCES AND FOR THE WARSAW PACT, IT WILL BE OPEN TO THE EAST TO CHALLENGE US ON BOTH THESE TOTALS. BUT IT IS NOT ONLY ON THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES THAT WE MAY EXPECT CHALLENGES FROM THE EAST. THEIR NEGOTIATORS HAVE ALREADY CHALLENGED OUR ASSERTION THAT THE WARSAW PACT HAS MORE THAN 15,000 TANKS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND HAVE SAID THAT THEY WILL PROVE THAT THIS FIGURE IS TOO HIGH. UNLESS ALLIED NEGOTIATORS CAN EFFECTIVELY COUNTER SUCH EASTERN ATTEMPTS, THE RATIONALE FOR OUR PROPOSALS ON PHASE I REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY, WILL BE AT RISK. THUS IT IS NOT ONLY ON MANPOWER FIGURES BUT ALSO ON TANK TOTALS THAT WE NEED CONTINGENCY PLANS TO  
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COUNTER EASTERN CHALLENGES. IT IS ABOVE ALL IN THIS AREA - DISCUSSION OF ESTIMATES FOR WARSAW PACT STRENGTHS - THAT THE NEED TO STUDY SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF FURTHER DISCLOSURE OF DATA ARISES.

SOME DELEGATIONS AHVE ARGUED THAT THE WORKING RROUP SHOULD NOT CONCERN ITSELF WITH TANK TOTALS BECAUSE THERE IS A RISK OF PREJUDICING THE ALLIED POSITION THAT EQUIPMENT IS NOT A SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE FIND THIS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. THE WORKING GROUP STUDY WOULD BE AN INTERNAL MATTER, PURELY FOR THE INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE OF THE SPC. IN ANY CASE, THE FIGURES WHICH WE ARE PROPOSING FOR FURTHER STUDY - WARSAW PACT AND NATO TANK TOTALS AND MANPOWER STRENGTHS IN "GREY AREAS" - ARE

ONES WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY BROUGHT INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS EITHER  
EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY BASIC WESTERN  
PROPOSALS. THE DISPARITY IN TANKS HAS THROUGHOUT BEEN A  
PROMINENT FEATURE OF OUR PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THE ALLIED  
APPROACH TO MBFR. THE PURPOSE OF THE WORKING GROUP STUDY  
WOULD BE TO FIND WAYS OF SUPPORTING AND MAINTAINING THE  
CREDIBILITY OF THESE WESTERN POSITIONS - NOT TO MOVE INTO NEW  
POLICY AREAS.

END TEXT OF UK STATEMENT

2. BEGIN TEXT OF UK PAPER:

MBFR: NATO RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE EASTERN CHALLENGES TO DATA  
TABLED BY THE ALLIES ON GROUND FORCE STRENGTHS.

1. THIS PAPER IS DESIGNED AS A CONTRIBUTION TO FURTHER DISCUSSION  
OF THIS SUBJECT IN THE SPC, AND AS A COMPENDIUM OF MATERIAL WHICH  
MAY BE DRAWN ON IN ANY SUBSEQUENT DETAILED STUDY. IT INDICATES  
UK VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF HOW FAR AND IN WHAT WAY ALLIED  
NEGOTIATORS MIGHT RESPOND, IN THE CONTEXT OF A SERIOUS  
RECIPROCAL DISCUSSION OF DATA, TO POSSIBLE EASTERN CHALLENGES  
ON CERTAIN ASSESSMENTS OF MANPOWER AND TANK STRENGTHS ALREADY  
TABLED BY THE WEST. THE QUESTION IS CONSIDERED HERE  
PRIMARILY FROM A MILITARY/TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW, BUT OUR  
ANALYSIS IS BASED ON THE POLITICAL ASSUMPTION THAT A MAJOR  
EASTERN PURPOSE WILL BE TO UNDERMINE THE CASE FOR BASIC WESTERN  
REDUCTIONS PROPOSALS AND THAT THIS IS SOMETHING ALLIED NEGOT-  
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IATORS SHOULD USE ALL AVAILABLE MEANS TO RESIST.

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN  
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1. WE HAVE ASSUED, THEREFORE, THAT EASTERN CHALLENGES WOULD BE AIMED TO SHOW THAT NATO'S ASSESSMENTS OF WARSAW PACT (HEREINAFTER WP) STRENGTHS WERE TOO HIGH AND/OR THAT THE FIGURES WE HAVE TABLED RELATING TO NATO'S OWN STRENGTH WERE TOO LOW. THE PAPER ALSO TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE ASSUMPTION THAT A PRESENT THE WP INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES ARE PROBABLY IN A BETTER POSITION TO ASSESS NATO FORCE STRENGTHS AND ORGANISATIONAL DETALIS, BECAUSE THEY ARE DISCUSSED FREELY IN THE WESTERN PRESS, THAN ARE NATO AGENCIES TO ASSESS THOSE OF THE WP.

WP CHALLENGES CONCERNING THEIR OWN STRENGTH

3. NATO INTELLIGENCE HAS INDICATED THAT IT IS CONFIDENT THAT ITS ESTIMATES ARE WITHIN 10 PCT. OF THE CORRECT FIGURES. IT HAS FURTHER INDICATED THAT IT HAS A HIGHER DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE IN ITS ESTIMATES OF COMBAT UNITS THAN IN THOSE OF HEADQUARTERS AND REAR SERVICE UNITS AND OF UNITS IN THE MILITARY INFRAS-  
TRUCTURE OF THE INDIGENOUS COUNTRIES IN THE NGA. THE UK THEREFORE BELIEVES THAT ANY WP OVERALL FIGURES THAT ARE MORE THAN 10 PCT. SMALLER THAN THE NATO ESTIMATES MUST BE DISPUTED.

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BUT WE WOULD GO FURTHER THAN THIS. TO ACCEPT WITHOUT DISPUTE A 10 PCT. UNDERESTIMATE OF NATO AGREED FIGURES WOULD BE TO ACCEPT A DECREASE IN WP MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II OF SOME 93,000 MEN OVERALL. IT COULD ALSO INVOLVE A SIGNIFICANT DECREASE IN THE CURRENTLY ASSESSED SOVIET TOTAL MANPOWER STRENGTH IN THE NGA AND THEREFORE AN IMPORTANT DIMINUTION IN SOVIET PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I. WE REALISE THAT ANY REDEFINITIONS THAT MAY BE ACCEPTED IN ORDER TO REMOVE ANOMALIES IN THE BASIS OF COUNTING MAY AFFECT THESE FIGURES, BUT SUCH RDDEFINITIONS ARE IN THEMSELVES LIKELY TO LOWER THE PRESENTLY ACCEPTED DISPARITIES (ESPECIALLY IN NSWP FORCES). WE THUS BELIEVE THAT IT IS CERTAINLY NECESSARY TO DISPUTE OVERALL FIGURES PUT FORWARD BY THE WP IF THEY ARE MORE THAN 5 PCT. LOWER THAN OUR OWN (EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF ANOMALY DISCUSSIONS - SEE ANNEX E). INDEED THERE IS A GOOD CASE, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, TO DISPUTE ANY WP FIGURES WHICH DIFFER MATERIALLY FROM A NATO ESTIMATE IN ORDER TO TEST THEIR REACTIONS.

4. THE QUESTION ARISES AS TO HOW THE NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA SHOULD TACKLE SUCH A TASK. CLEARLY IT WOULD BE FRUITLESS TO SAY THAT WP FIGURES APPEARED TO BE TOO LOW; THIS WOULD SIMPLY INVITE A DENIAL AND BRING DATA DISCUSSIONS TO A DEADLOCK. WE CONSIDER THEREFORE THAT FROM THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL VIEWPOINT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE NATO NEGOTIATORS SHOULD BE GIVEN THE AUTHORITY

TO OFFER AN EXCHANGE OF DETAILED DATA TO SUPPORT EACH CASE.

5. TWO PROBLEMS ARISE IN THIS CONNECTION: THE SECURITY OF THE SOURCES OF NATO INFORMATION, AND THE DISCLOSURES OF THE DEPTH OF AND DETAIL OF NATO'S INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE FIRST OF THESE PROBLEMS SHOULD GIVE ANY PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO PROVE NATO'S CASE IN TERMS SUFFICIENTLY GENERAL NOT TO POINT TO ANY PARTICULAR SOURCE. HOWEVER, WE RECOGNISE THAT THE SECOND PROBLEM HAS SOME SUBSTANCE WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO MEET A DATA CHALLENGE WITHOUT GOING SOME WAY TOWARDS INDICATING HOW OUR ESTIMATES HAVE BEEN REACHED. IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE DANGEROUS TO VOLUNTEER A GREAT DEAL OF DETAIL; WE WOULD NOT WISH TO HAVE A BATTALION-BY-BATTALION DISCUSSION. BUT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DEPLOY OUR CASE IN TERMS THAT ARE AT THE SAME TIME REASONABLY GENERAL AND YET SUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC TO DEMAND AN EQUALLY DETAILED RESPONSE BY THE WP. AT ANNEXES A TO E  
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WE SHOW THE SORT OF ARGUMENTS THAT WE THINK MIGHT BE PUT FORWARD.

6. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO MAKE SUCH A COMPREHENSIVE ANSWER IN A SINGLE PRESENTATION. THE GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE ARGUMENTS COULD BE SO PUT FORWARD INITIALLY AND THEN BE ELABORATED AT SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS, BUT WE SUGGEST THAT THE AD HOC GROUP IN VIENNA COULD BE GIVEN THE AUTHORITY IN EACH CASE TO CONSIDER THE TACTICS AND METHODS TO BE USED. IN ANY EVENT IT SHOULD BE MADE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO WP NEGOTIATORS THAT FIGURES TO SUPPORT A CASE WILL ONLY BE SUPPLIED ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCITY. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE WP WILL BE MOST UNWILLING TO SUPPLY MUCH DETAILED INFORMATION. THAT NEED NOT MATTER; IT IS TO NATO'S ADVANTAGE, AND IT WILL HELP NATO TO MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE, TO APPEAR TO BE THE MORE WILLING TO DO SO.

7. WE BELIEVE THAT BY DEMONSTRATING A WILLINGNESS TO ARGUE OUR CASE IN SUCH DETAIL RIGHT FROM THE START. WE WILL DO MUCH TO DETER THE WP FROM DELIBERATELY UNDERSTATING THEIR FIGURES. THIS CAN ONLY AID THE PROGRESS AND INCREASE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DATA DISCUSSIONS.

#### WP CHALLENGES CONCERNING NATO'S OWN STRENGTH

8. WE HAVE SO FAR CONSIDERED A CHALLENGE TO NATO'S ASSESSMENTS OF WP DATA. WE MUST BE EQUALLY PREPARED TO RESPOND TO A WP CHALLENGE THAT THE DATA WE SUPPLY ON OUR OWN FORCES IS TOO LOW. HERE WE WILL BE CONSIDERING THE SECURITY OF OUR OWN CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE IN SUCH A CASE BY ENCOURAGING THE WP TO TAKE THE SAME SORT OF ACTION THAT WE HAVE RECOMMENDED FOR OURSELVES, IE TO OUTLINE THEIR CASE AND OFFER TO SUPPORT IT BY A STEP-BY-STEP EXCHANGE OF DATA. IF WE DEMONSTRATE OUR INTENTION TO CHALLENGE SUCH

WP ASSERTIONS FROM THE START, WE MAY SUCCEED IN DISSUADING THE  
WP FROM RAISING FURTHER OBJECTIONS TO NATO FIGURES AND THEREBY  
PERSUADE THEM TO ACCEPT NATO'S OWN ASSESSMENTS.

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 5 USNATO 2854

NATO'S OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER STRENGTHOM IN THE EVENT THAT  
THE WP SHOULD SAY THAT NATO GROUND FORCES  
IN THE NGA EXCEED 790,000, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT NATO NEGOTIATORS  
COULD TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE INITIALLY:

A. TO CONFIRM THAT NATO TOTALS INCLUDE FRENCH GROUND FORCE  
MANPOWER IN THE NGA AND FRENCH, UK AND US FORCES STATIONED IN  
BERLIN.

B. TO POINT OUT THAT THE STRENGTH OF EACH NATO NATIONS'S  
GROUND FORCE IN THE NGA IS PUBLISHED ANNUALLY IN UNCLASSIFIED  
DOCUMENTS. (THE UK STRENGTH, FOR EXAMPLE, IS SHOWN IN THE  
"STATEMENT ON THE DEFENCE ESTIMATES, 1975".) THE WP ARE IN A  
POSITION, THEREFORE TO AGGREGATE THESE NATIONAL TOTALS AND  
ARRIVE ACCORDINGLY AT AN OVERALL TOTAL.

10. IF THE WP STILL MAINTAIN THEIR CHALLENGE, THE NATO RESPONSE  
COULD BE THAT THE WP, AS THE CHALLENGER, MUST PROVIDE A  
BREAKDOWN OF THEIR OWN ASSESSED FIGURES FOR NATO TO SUPPORT  
THEIR CLAIM. A DECISION WOULD THEN HAVE TO BE MADE BY NATO,  
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IN THE LIGHT OF THE TYPE OF DATA THE WP NEGOTIATORS PRODUCE,  
AS TO HOW WE SHOULD REFUTE THE WP ASSERTION. WE BELIEVE THAT IT  
WOULD BE IN NATO'S OVERALL INTEREST FOR OUR NEGOTIATORS  
TO BE AUTHORISED TO MAKE USE OF NATIONAL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER  
TOTALS AND OF COMBAT FORMATION DATA IN THIS EVENT.

#### US GROUND FORCE MANPOWER STRENGTH IN THE NGA

11. WE SUGGEST THAT NATO NEGOTIATORS COULD FOLLOW A SIMILAR  
PROCEDURE TO THAT OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPHS 9 AND 10 ABOVE  
SHOULD THE WP STATE THAT THE US GROUND FORCE STRENGTH IN THE NGA  
IS MORE THAN 193,000.

#### NATO'S TOTAL TANK STRENGTH IN ACTIVE UNITS

12. SHOULD THE WP NEGOTIATORS CHALLENGE NATO'S STATED TANK  
STRENGTH IN ACTIVE UNITS IN THE NGA, WE SUGGEST THAT NATO NEGOT-  
IATORS MUST DEMAND OF THE WP NEGOTIATORS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR  
ASSESSED FIGURE. IN ORDER TO REFUTE WP FIGURES, NATO NEGOT-  
IATORS SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO SAY THAT THE NUMBER OF TANKS NATO  
ARMOURED UNITS CONTAIN IS WIDELY KNOWN IN THE WEST (AND THEREFORE  
BY THE EAST). (FOR EXAMPLE, UK TANK STRENGTHS HAVE APPEARED IN  
THE UK NATIONAL PRESS AS RECRUITING INFORMATION.) IT IS ALSO  
WIDELY KNOWN, ON AN UNCLASSIFIED BASIS (EG THROUGH THE POSTAL  
SERVICES), HOW MANY TANK UNITS EACH NATION HAS THE WP CAN THEMSELVES  
CONFIRM THE ACCURACY OF THE NATO TOTAL FIGURES.

13. IN ADDITION, IF NECESSARY, WE BELIEVE THAT ALLIED NEGOTIATORS  
COULD BE AUTHORISED TO DISCLOSE NATIONAL TANK STRENGTHS IN  
ACTIVE UNITS AND THE NUMBER OF TANK UNITS HELD ON THEIR ACTIVE  
ORDER OF BATTLE TOGETHER WITH THE TANK HOLDINGS OF SUCH UNITS.

#### NATO'S TOTAL RESERVE TANK STRENGTH

14. IF WP NEGOTIATORS SAY THAT RESERVE TANK STRENGTH SHOULD BE  
INCLUDED AND ASK FOR DETAILS OF HOLDINGS, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE  
NATO REPLY SHOULD BE THAT MBFR PROPOSALS DEAL WITH ACTUAL ACTIVE  
DUTY STRENGTHS. RESERVE TANKS ARE NOT, THEREFORE, INCLUDED  
IN NATO TANKS FIGURES, ALTHOUGH, OF COURSE, EACH NATO NATION DOES  
POSSESS AN UNCREWED RESERVE OF TANKS IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
NATIONAL ESTIMATES OF MAINTENANCE AND WASTAGE RATES.

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#### CONCLUSIONS

15. THE FOLLOWING ARE OUR CONCLUSIONS. THEY COULD FORM A BASIS  
FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP AND/OR FOR ANSWERING  
SUBSEQUENT QUERIES FROM ALLIED NEGOTIATORS ABOUT HOW THEY SHOULD  
RESPOND TO SPECIFIC EASTERN CHALLENGES.

A. WP CHALLENGES OF NATO ESTIMATES OF WP STRENGTH SHOULD BE  
COUNTERED BY NATO NEGOTIATORS:

(1) IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, IN ORDER TO TEST WP REACTIONS,  
IF A WP FIGURE DIFFERS MATERIALLY FROM A NATO ESTIMATE.  
SUBSEQUENTLY, IN ANY CASE, SHOULD A WP FIGURE RESULT IN A  
REDUCTION OF AN OVERALL PACT OR A NATIONAL WP STRENGTH BY  
MORE THAN 5 PCT. EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF A DISCUSSION OF  
ANOMALIES - SEE ANNEX E.

(2) IN THE MANNER OUTLINED IN ANNEXES A TO E.

B. WP CHALLENGES OF NATO ESTIMATES OF NATO STRENGTHS SHOULD BE  
COUNTERED BY NATO NEGOTIATORS:

(1) AT ALL TIMES.

(2) IN THE MANNER OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPHS 9 TO 14 ABOVE.

C. BY DEMONSTRATING A WILLINGNESS TO ARGUE OUR CASE FROM THE  
START AND TO MAKE USE OF DETAILED DATA TO SUPPORT IT, NATO  
NEGOTIATORS WILL DETER THE WP FROM DELIBERATELY UNDERSTATING  
THEIR FIGURES SUBSEQUENTLY.

D. NATO HAS LESS TO LOSE THAN THE WP IN DISCLOSING DATA  
DETAILS WHICH CAN BE WIDELY KNOWN IN THE WEST OUTSIDE MILITARY  
CIRCLES.

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ANNEX A

BEGIN UNDERLINE RESPONSE TO CHALLENGE ON OVERALL TOTAL



WP MANPOWER STRENGTH END UNDERLINE

(UNDERLINED FIGURES ARE DATA NOT HITHERTO DISCLOSED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS)

1. BEGIN UNDERLINE POSSIBLE LINE OF CHALLENGE END UNDERLINE

- A. NATO HAS WRONGLY INCLUDED CERTAIN ELEMENTS.
- B. NO ALLOWANCE HAS BEEN MADE FOR UNITS WHICH ARE AT LESS THAN FULL ESTABLISHED STRENGTH.
- C. NATO'S ESTIMATE IS FAR TOO HIGH.

BEGIN UNDERLINE RESPONSE END UNDERLINE

2. THE ANSWER TO 1A. ABOVE IS THAT THE WESTERN NATIONS ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANOMALIES AND DEFINITIONS IF THE EAST WILL PRODUCE ITS DETAILED SUGGESTIONS (SEE ANNEX E).

3. AS FAR AS THE ANSWER TO 1B. IS CONCERNED, NATO IS WELL AWARE  
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THAT NOT ALL SIMILAR UNITS ARE ON STANDARD ORGANISATIONS, EVEN WITHIN NATIONAL ARMIES, AND THAT THEREFORE THEY HAVE DIFFERENT MANPOWER TOTALS. NATO IS EQUALLY AWARE THAT UNITS ARE KEPT AT DIFFERING LEVELS OF AMNNING IN PEACETIME. FULL ALLOWANCE HAS BEEN MADE IN NATO'S ESTIMATES FOR THESE FACTORS AND WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEM IN MORE DETAIL AND TO PUT FORWARD FUTHER DATA ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCITY.

4. WITH REGARD TO 1C. ABOVE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXCHANGE ESTIMATES ON A NATIONAL BASIS IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY WHERE THE MAJOR DIFFERENCES LIE.

5. OUR ESTIMATE IS BASED ON OUR INFORMATION OF BEGIN UNDERLINE  
58 DIVISIONS END UNDERLINE OF

THE WP IN THE NGA, OF WHICH A HIGH PERCENTAGE ARE MANNED TO HIGH LEVELS. OUR ESTIMATES MAKE FULL ALLOWANCE FOR THE MOBILISATION WHICH SOME DIVISIONS REQUIRE BUT STILL SHOW OVER BEGIN UNDERLINE  
510,000 END UNDERLINE IN THESE DIVISIONS. IN ADDITION THERE ARE, OF COURSE, VERY LARGE NUMBERS OF MEN IN ARMY AND HIGHER LEVEL UNITS, MANY OF WHICH ARE ALSO AT A HIGH STATE OF READINESS, AND, PARTICULARLY IN THE INDIGENOUS FORCES, FURTHER LARTE NUMBERS IN AIR DEFENCE UNITS, TRAINING ORGANISATIONS AND IN THE MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE OF FORCES.

WE HAVE MADE NO ALLOWANCE IN OUR ESTIMATES FOR THE CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS OF ARMED PARA-MILITARY UNITS WHICH ALSO EXIST.

6. FURTHER RESPONSE WOULD DEPEND ON THE WP REACTION TO THE POINTS MADE ABOVE. IF THEY ACCEPTED THE OFFER TO EXCHANGE NATIONAL

L  
DATA FURTHER INFORMATION COULD BE OFFERED ON SIMILAR LINS TO THAT FOR SOVIET FORCES AT ANNEX B.

ANNEX B

BEGIN UNDERLINE RESPONSE TO CHALLENGE ON SOVIET MANPOWER  
FIGURES END UNDERLINE

(UNDERLINED FIGURES ARE DATA NOT HITHERTO DISCLOSED IN THE  
NEGOTIATIONS)

1. BEGIN UNDERLINE POSSIBLE LINE OF CHALLENGE END UNDERLINE  
A. NATO HAS WRONGLY INCLUDED CERTAIN ELEMENTS.  
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B. NATO'S ESTIMATE IS FAR TOO HIGH.  
C. NO ALLOWANCE HAS BEEN MADE FOR UNITS WHICH ARE AT LESS  
THAN FULL STRENGTH.

BEGIN UNDERLINE POSSIBLE RESPONSE END UNDERLINE

2. NATO NATIONS ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANOMALIES AND DEFINITIONS  
IF THE EAST WILL PRODUCE ITS DETAILED FIGURES.

3. NATO'S INFORMATION LEADS IT TO BELIEVE THAT SOVIET DIVISIONS  
IN THE NGA ARE MAINTAINED AT OR NEAR FULL STRENGTH IN PEACE TIME.  
THE SAME IS TRUE OF MANY NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS. NATO ACCEPTS THAT  
CERTAIN NON-COMBAT UNITS REQUIRE SOME AUGMENTATION AND ALLOWANCES  
HAVE BEEN MADE FOR THESE IN THE FIGURES PUT FORWARD. WE ARE PRE-  
PARED TO DISCUSS FIGURES IN MORE DETAIL AND TO PUT FORWARD  
FURTHER DATA ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCITY.

4. NATO ASSESSES THAT USSR HAS BEGIN UNDERLINE 14 TANK DIVISIONS  
END UNDERLINE AND BEGIN UNDERLINE 13 MOTOR RIFLE DIVISIONS  
END UNDERLINE IN THE NGA, AND THAT AT FULL STRENGTH THESE DIV-  
ISIONS WOULD CONTAIN RESPECTIVELY BEGIN UNDERLINE OVER 9600 END  
UNDERLINE AND BEGIN UNDERLINE OVER 12,200 END UNDERLINE MEN.  
AT SUCH STRENGTHS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MEN IN SOVIET DIVISIONS WOULD  
AMOUNT TO OVER 293,000. IN FACT NATO'S ASSESSMENT IS THAT THEY  
INCLUDE SOME 7,000 MEN LESS THAN THIS, IE SOME BEGIN UNDERLINE  
286,000. END UNDERLINE

5. IT WILL BE APPARENT THAT THIS FIGURE IS ABOUT 60PERCENT OF THE  
479,000 SOVIET MANPOWER FIGURE WHICH WE HAVE PUT FORWARD. YET  
WE HAVE NOT INCLUDED ANY OF THE HEADQUARTERS OR UNITS AT ARMY  
OR HIGHER LEVEL, NOR ANY TRAINING UNITS. DIVISIONS CANNOT, AND  
DO NOT, EXIST WITHOUT NEEDING A GREAT DEAL OF SUPPORT FROM SUCH  
UNITS, NOT ONLY AFTER MOBILISATION BUT IN PEACETIME AS WELL. WE  
KNOW THAT VERY MANY SUCH UNITS EXIST OFTEN AT HIGH STATES OF  
MANNING AND WE CANNOT RECONCILE WITH THESE FACTS THE VERY LOW  
FIGURES PUT FORWARD BY THE EAST.

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

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ANNEX C

BEGIN UNDERLINE RESPONSE TO CHALLENGE ON OVERALL TANK TOTALS END  
UNDERLINE

(UNDERLINED FIGURES ARE DATA NOT HITHERTO DISCLOSED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS)

1. BEGIN UNDERLINE POSSIBLE LINE OF CHALLENGE END UNDERLINE

- A. NATO'S ESTIMATE IS TOO HIGH.
- B. NATO HAS WRONGLY INCLUDED TANKS WHICH ARE NOT IN COMBAT UNITS BUT ARE MRERELY HELD TO REPLACE CASUALTIES.
- C. OBSOLETE TANKS AWAITING SCRAPPING HAVE BEE WRONGLY INCLUDED.

BEGIN UNDERLINE RESPONSE END UNDERLINE

2. NATO HAS BEEN INTERESTED TO NOTE IN THE RECENT PAST A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN WP TANK STRENGTHS IN ACTIVE UNITS IN THE NGA. NATO HAS NOTED THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS  
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CONSIDERABLE REINFORCEMENT IS NOT ENTIRELY CONSISTENT, THAT SOME NATIONS HAVE ADOPTED IT TO A GREATER DEGREE THAN OTHERS AND THAT EVEN WITHIN NATIONAL FORCES IT HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED IN DIFFERING DEGREES. BUT THE TOTAL EFFECT IS THAT A CONSIDERABLE REINFORCE-

MENT OF TANKS HAS OCCURRED.

3. NEARLY A HALF OF THE PACT'S BEGIN UNDERLINE 58 DIVISIONS END

UNDERLINE IN THE NGA ARE TANK DIVISIONS. THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF TANKS  
IN EACH IS BEGIN UNDERLINE WELL OVER 300. END UNDERLINE EVEN  
IN MOTORISED INFANTRY DIVISIONS THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF TANKS IS  
BEGIN UNDERLINE OVER 220. END UNDERLINE WE HOLD THAT THERE  
ARE A TOTAL OF BEGIN UNDERLINE NEARLY 15,000 TANKS IN COMBAT  
DIVISIONS END UNDERLINE OF THE PACT ALONE.

4. OUR INFORMATION IS THAT THERE ARE A SIGNIFICANT NUM-  
BER OF TANKS IN CERTAIN NON-DIVISIONAL AND TRAINING UNITS. THERE  
ARE ALSO A LARGE NUMBER IN RESERVE, AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED AS THIS  
IS MERELY A NORMAL PRECAUTION FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF CASUALTIES.  
IN VIEW OF THE VERY HIGH NUMBER OF TANKS IN COMBAT UNITS WE CANNOT  
ACCEPT THAT WE HAVE MADE TOO HIGH AN ESTIMATE OVERALL.

5. TANKS IN NON-DIVISIONAL AND TRAINING UNITS ARE CLEARLY PART  
OF THE THREAT. WE HAVE INCLUDED SUCH EQUIPMENTS IN BOTH NATO AND  
WP FIGURES AND INSIST THAT WE ARE RIGHT TO DO SO.

6. IF WP NEGOTIATORS ALLEGE THAT WE HAVE INCLUDED ANY OBSOLETE  
AND UNSERVICEABLE TANKS WE SHALL BE HAPPY TO RECEIVE DETAILS OF  
THEIR NUMBERS AND LOCATION AND TO CONSIDER WHETHER THEY SHOULD BE  
OMITTED.

7. IF THE EAST WISHES FURTHER DETAILS OF NATIONAL FIGURES, WE  
COULD EXCHANGE ESTIMATES ON THE LINES OF THE INFORMATION IN  
ANNEX D.

#### ANNEX D

BEGIN UNDERLINE RESPONSE TO CHALLENGE ON SOVIET TANK TOTALS END  
UNDERLINE

(UNDERLINED FIGURES ARE DATA NOT HITHERTO DISCLOSED IN THE NEGO-  
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TIATIONS)

BEGIN UNDERLINE POSSIBLE LINES OF CHALLENGE END UNDERLINE

1. AS IN ANNEX C.

BEGIN UNDERLINE RESPONSE END UNDERLINE

2. NATO BELIEVES THAT SOVIET DIVISIONS IN THE NGA HAVE THEIR FULL  
WARTIME SCALE OF TANKS ON ISSUE. WE COUNT BEGIN UNDERLINE 14  
SOVIET TANK DIVISIONS END UNDERLINE AND BEGIN UNDERLINE 13  
MOTOR RIFLE DIVISIONS END UNDERLINE IN THE NGA. OUR INFORMATION  
IS THAT EACH TANK DIVISION HAS BEGIN UNDERLINE WELL OVER 300  
END UNDERLINE TANKS AND EACH MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION BEGIN UNDERLINE  
OVER 260 TANKS, END UNDERLINE GIVING A TOTAL OF SOME 8000  
TANKS IN SOVIET DIVISIONS IN THE NGA.

3. WE ESTIMATE THAT THE USSR HAS BEGIN UNDERLINE OVER 1700  
TANKS END UNDERLINE IN THE NGA IN NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS AND IN  
TRAINING UNITS. THE TOTAL OF SOVIET TANKS IS THEREFORE 9740.

4. RESPONSES TO OTHER QUESTIONS ARE AS IN ANNEX C/ NOTE:  
NO SOVIET RESERVE TANKS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN THE AREA/.  
END TEXT OF UK PAPERBRUCE

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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